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Texas Journal of Women and the Law
Volume I

Book Review
In Search of a Normative Principle
for Property Division at Divorce
Patricia A. Cain*
THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF

DIVORCE REFORM. By Martha Albertson Fineman. Chicago: The

University of Chicago Press, 1991. Pp. 190 (with notes and index
252). $27.50.

Feminists have wrestled with the concept of equality for some
time. In the nineteenth century, feminists demanded "equal
treatment" in the form of equal access to education and to jobs, often
without success.' Early in the twentieth century, feminists requested and the Supreme Court upheld protective labor legislation, despite
its apparent conflict with the principle of equality.2 The "special

* Professor of Law, University of Iowa. I am grateful to my colleagues, Eric Andersen and lean Love., for
reading and commenting on an early draft of this essay. Jill Altman provided valuable research assistance on this
project.
1. See ELEANOR PLEXNER, CENTPRY o' STRUOGLE 2340 (1959) (discussing the feminist battle for equal
education in the early 19th century); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (denying Myra Bradwers
plea for equal access to the practice of law); Goesat v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding a state restriction
on women bartenders). But see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (overruling Goear).
2. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding a maximum-hour provision that protected only
working women). See gra!/mUy Frances Olsen, From False Paternalismto False Equality: Judicial Asadtr on
FenLntc: Canummty, Illinois 1869-1895, 84 IdicH. L. REv. 1518 (1986) (giving an interesting history of early
feminist activity in support of protective labor legislation).
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treatment" versus "equal treatment" debate continues today as
feminists grapple with the problem of pregnancy in the workplace
The fight for sex equality, in the latter part of the twentieth
century, has taken place in state legislatures, in Congress, and in
state and federal courts. The United States Supreme Court did not
recognize sex equality as a constitutional principle until 1971;" that
year marked a turning point in constitutional litigation. Encouraged
by this early success, feminist litigators began filing more cases in
federal court challenging laws that treated women differently from
men. 5 As these cases worked their way up to the Supreme Court,
a new jurisprudence of sex equality was developed. Early on, we
learned that discrimination against pregnant women raised no
constitutional issue of sex equality.6 After one preliminary sign of
hope,7 we learned that sex equality would not be accorded the same
constitutional protection as race equality.' We also learned that men
and women are not similarly situated with respect to the military
draft,9 statutory rape, 10 or their own illegitimate children."
The feminist debate over equality that followed the development
of this new Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence initially centered
on whether equal treatment is the best equality model for sex
3. See, eg., Hera Hill KY , Equaity andDffertw. The Case ofPregnancy, I BERKEMLY WoMlE'S LJ.
1 (1985) (arguing in favor of materity leaves for pregnant employees in order to give female workers equal
opportunity to keep their jobs when compared with male worker who have also engaged in reproductive sex);
Linda 3. Krieger & Patrici N. Cooecy, The Mkr-Wohl Catroversy: Equal Treatmnt, Pasadve Actton and the
Meaming fWanersFualry,13 GOLDEN GATB U. L. REV.: WoltE.'s LAW Foitum 513 (1983) (discussing the
need for positive action as opposed to equal treaoant in the workplace when dealg with pregnancy and
4. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 74 (1971) (strikng down, on equal protection grouds. an Idaho statuto fha
preferred males over females in appoiting estate administratora).
5. Professor (now Judge) Ruth Bader Gisburg was a major participant in this era offeminist ligation. See
Ruth B. Ginsbog & Barbara Flagg, Sse Rolectims on the Fanbuis Legal Thought ofthe 1970's, 1989 U. Cu.
LEMAT F. 9 (giving a Cce and insightful vlew of this period of feminist action).
6. See, e g.,Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding that the exclusion of women from receiving
disabllity benefits on the basis of pregnancy does not violat the Equal Protection Clause of the Futeenth
7. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (holding by four justices that sex discrimination was
enaitled to the as= heightened scrutiny accorded race discrimination).
8. See Craig v. Boa, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (establishing us of in intermediate scnainy test for sex
diserimination ease).
9. Rosdker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-83 (1981) (holding that Congress acted within its proper discretion
by authorizing the registration ofa select group of men for mwtazy service, without ineluding women).
10. WMcl M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981) (upholding the conviction ofa seventeen-yearold male for engaging in consensual sex with a sixten-year-old female under a Califomnia statute that crimhnslized
only the male's conducQ. The court went en to statz that 'the Equa Protecton Clause does not 'demand that a
statute necessarily apply equally to all persons' or require 'thiags which armdifferent in fact... to be treated in
law as though ty were the same." (quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 149 (194)).
11. Padam v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347. 349 (1979) (upholding a Georgia satuae that Permitted mothers, but
not fathers, of illegm- children to su for wrongful death of the child.
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discrimination cases. Focusing on the differences between men and
women as a class, some feminists have argued that special treatment
is a better model, especially with respect to pregnancy-related
issues. 12 Other feminists have tried to redefine equality to meet the
concerns raised by the different social, legal, and economic positions
of men and women in society.13 More recently, feminist theorists
have argued that because equality analysis masks deeper problems,
feminist litigators ought to move beyond equality arguments in the
fight for meaningful social change. 4
The feminist debate has focused primarily on sex equality issues
in the public sphere, including the job market, as well as in
governmental, 16 educational, 17 and social institutions." Perhaps
equal protection challenges have not been as prevalent in the more
private spheres of sex and family because such spheres are protected
from governmental invasion by constitutional claims of privacy and
liberty.' This is not to suggest that equal protection challenges
12. See =Tqra note 3; see also Wendy W. Wiliams, Equaitys Rdd& Pregnancy and the Equal Treatmeri/Spedal Tr anftDebte, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANOE 325 (1985) (rejectiAg the special treatnmnt
approach in favor of an equal treatment approach that ia broad enough to cover all temporarily disabled workers,
inluding those disabled by pregnancy).
13. Christine Liuletoo, ReconsMting Smal Equaity, 75 CAL. L. ReV. 1279, 1304-36 (1987).
14. Lucinda M. inley,
Trnscending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Matenity and the Workplace
Debate, 86 CoLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1121 (1986) (suggesting that the equallspecial treatment debate distracts from
a deeper analysis of the root problems of gender hierarchy); Patricia Cain, Fmbirm and the Lidm of Equaiy,
24 GA.L. REV. 803, 806 (1990) ("M(eminit theory will be better served if we refocus our energy from the debate
about equality to a more direct debate about the meaning of self-defmition.").
15. See Cain, supra note 14, at 804 (noting that equallspecial treatment debate focusea on pregnancy in the
workforce).
16. Equality as to governmental benefits sometimea raises the question of affirmative action, e.g., whether
government can favor women to make up for past discriminations. See, eg., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351
(1974) (upholding a state tax preference for widows, but not widowers); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498
(1975) (upholding a navy regulation that gave women extra time to cam required promotions).
17. See, eg., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (holding that a statc-supported
university which limits its enrollment to women violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Deborah L. Rhode, Assocdion and AsAmlat4o, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 106, 128-142 (1986)
(discussing equality as an ideal that raises the issue of separate but equal in the context of educational institutions).
18. Equal access to power in society was the goal behind feminist challenges to certain private clubs. Equality
arguments in this context rais sues of the conflicting rights to privacy and association. See, e.g., New York
State Club Ass'n v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1 (1988) (holding that New York City's Human Rights Law is not
unconstitutional); Board of Directors of Rotary Int'i v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) (holding that the Unruh
Act requiring California Rotary Clubs to admit women did not violate the First Amcdmt); Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (holding that the Minnesta Human Rights Act compelling Jaycees to accept
women did not violate mal member's freedom of association); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Assocaton and
Assbniaton, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 106 (1986) (analyzing scxually segregated associations).
19. See FrancesOlsen, The Famiy andtheMarket.A Stdy ofIdeology andLegalRefonn, 96 H v. L. REV.
1497 (1983) (discussing the dichotomy between public market place and private family). Some feminists argue
that equality arguments ought to be made more often in the private sphere because privacy arguments serve the
interests of the more powerful by maintaining the status quo. Equality arguments, by contrast, &s the state to
implement equality by aiding the less powerful. See, eg., CATsARINE MACKINNON, .rmmSism
UNMoDuqFD 93102 (1987) (suggesting that classifying abortion as aprivate right ban change in the "existing distribuion of power
HeinOnline -- 1 Tex. J. Women & L. 251 1992
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have never been raised in the family law arena; the equal protection
2
clause has been specifically applied to the questions of alimony, 0
spousal rights to manage community property,2 and a putative
father's right to a relationship with his child.? I only mean to
suggest that the feminist debate over equality has addressed a greater
number of issues in public arenas such as employment and education
than in the more private arena of family law. The debated ideas
have included affmative action for women, special treatment versus
equal treatment, the possibility of separate but equal treatment, and
the critique of equality as non-neutral.? Some of these debates
have been intense, and the process has enriched the current feminist
understanding of equality by clarifying the benefits and detriments
of using equality rhetoric to gain rights for women in the public
sphere. An analogous debate in the sphere of family law would
surely produce a similarly beneficial depth of understanding and
knowledge about the role of equality in both acquiring and protecting
rights for women in the private sphere.
Martha Fineman is a feminist scholar who engages in the debate
over equality in the family law context. Over the past ten years, she
has produced a-substantial body of scholarship warning that equality
arguments are ill-suited to remedy the very real inequalities that exist

and resourcos within the private sphere'); see also Ruth Colker, An Equal Ptoiection Anayr of UnId State
Reproductive HealthPd: Gender, Race Age, and C la, 1991 DUxs LJ. 324, 355-57 (Suggesting a framcwork
to create Agender-based equal protection policy that is attentive to the impact of United States reproductive helm
policies 0n adolescent women); Robin West, Eqal4 Theory, MaialRape, and the Prmiae of the Fourteemth
Amenenemn, 42 FLA. L. Rev. 45, 50 (1990) ('[TIbe enduranc of maria rape exemptiona partly is a function of
the, inadequacy of the dominant legal understanding of the coastittaoad mandate of equal protection.').
20. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (holding that an ex-husband in arrcara on alimony paymenta could raise
defense that state hw imposing alimony obligations on husbands but not wives violates the Equal Protectim Clause
of the Fourteenth Amecdment).
21. E.g., Kirebberg v. Fecnstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (holding that a Louiiana statute giving a husband the
unilateral right to dispose of jointly owned community property without his wife's consent violates tho Equal
Proection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
22. See, ag., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 349 (1979); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979)
(hoMing that a sex-basd distinction in a New York statuto preventing a putative father from objecting to the
adoption ofhis child violated the Equal Protection Clause of th Fourteenth Amendment); Lehr v. Robertson, 463
U.S. 248 (1983) (holding that a New York statute refusing to rectgnie parental rights of a putative father who
had never established a substanti relationship with his child was not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause);
Vichael H. v. Gerald D., III S. Ct. 1645 (1991) (applying California's presumption that a woman's husband is
the father of her children to deny parental rights to the biokgical father).
23. I am referring to the criticism that sex equality is a comparative right that neessrily compares womm
to men. Thus, the normative principles about what rights individuals ought to have arc all sa in mal terms. in
this case, women benefit only to the extent they ar similar to men. They ca obtain male-defined rights under
equality, butnomore. Historically, of course, thes male-der.ed rights were designWd to beefit men of privilege,
typically whit male property owners. See MARTHA MtNow, MXMro ALL mE DWERENCm 56 (1990) ('It is
misleading to treat the implicit norm as consisting of all men, as rh toric for women's rights tends to do, for that
obscures historical racial and class differences in the treiment of men hemselvcs.').
HeinOnline -- 1 Tex. J. Women & L. 252 1992
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in marriage and divorce.'
Her recent book, The Illusion of
Equality,'5 makes this scholarship available in a single, coherent
source.' Feminist theorists and family law experts alike will find
much of value in this book, whether or not they agree with Fineman's conclusions.
The book is divided into two parts, with the first part focusing

on property divisions at divorce and the second part focusing on
child custody issues.'
Because I am particularly interested in
property division issues, I will concentrate on the first portion of the
book in this review.28 I choose to focus on property division
because I think that we need a normative theory to guide us in
making decisions about property at divorce. Equality theory is one
possibility.
The problem with equality as a normative principle is that
equality can have different meanings.29 Equality theory has
evolved as scholars have wrestled with these different meanings and

tried to explain which meaning is best suited to which task. For
example, some feminists support the concept of marriage as a
partnership of equals in which husband and wife are presumed to
make equally valuable contributions, despite the differences in kind
of those contributions.3" Under one meaning of equality, this

24. See Mauth& Pieman, Implementing Equality:Ideology, Conwadicionand Social Change, 1983 Wis. L.
REV. 789 (arguing that because of socio-ecooomie factors that ote disadvantage women, divorce reform should
focus on result equality); Martha Fineman, Iffusive Equality: On Weftman's Divorce Revolution 1986 AM. B.
FouND. REs. J. 781 (reviewing LNoR J. WBITzmAN, THB Divorce RavowmON (1985)).
25. MAtTHAFINEMAR, ILLUSION Op EQUALITY: Tet RHETOIc AND REALTY Op DivoRcE REFoRM (1991).
26. Fineman's book covers material that she has previously written about. Fineman, supra note 24; Martha
Fineman & Annie Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal Policymakidn: Custody Determination at
Divorce, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 107; Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, ProfessionalLanguage, and Legal
Change in Child Custody DecirionmakIng, 101 HARV. L. REv. 727 (1988); Martha Fineman, The Politcis of
CQstody and the Transformaton of Ameican Custody Decision Making, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 829 (1989);
Martha Fineman, Challenging Law, Establiling Differences: The Future ofFeminist Legal Scholarship, 42 U.
FLA. L. REv. 25 (1990).
27. FwINmAN, supra note 25, at 173-90. There is a Part IMin the book as well, but it consists of a single
chapter setting forth Fineman's proposals regarding property division and child custody.
28. Of course, child custody is relevant to property division issues. The possibility of mandatory joint custody
is a prime example of how equality rhetoric has been used to disadvantage many women. These two aspects of
child custody are topics on which I will touch in this review. However, Finema's book contains much more, and
I would do her bock a disservice if I did not note that her work on child custody issues is superb. In short,
Fineuan prefers clearly delineated rules to determine custody, less participation in the process by so-called experts,
and decisions that are more final once made. For sheer efficiency, these proposals have much to commend them.
29. Indeed, according to some theorists, equality may have no meaning at all. See, e.g., Peter Westen, The
Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REv. 537 (1982) (arguing that the rhetoric of equality should be abandoned).
30. See Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the Reforms: Feminist
Perspectiveson Divorce Law, in DIVORCE REFoRMs AT ThE CROSSROADs 191, 198 (Stephen D. Sugarman &
Herma H. Kay eds., 1990) (advocating equal division between men and women of economic losses resulting from
divorce).
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presumed existence of equal contribution during marriage supports
an equal distribution of marital property at divorce. The principle
of equality implicated in this normative argument is that equal
contributions deserve equal reward."
In law, this principle is
reflected in the notion of equal treatment: equal contributions should
be treated equally at the time of divorce.
Presumed equality, however, is not real equality. If contribution
to the marriage is the relevant factor, then a true equality norm
would require an accurate measurement of actual contributions in
place of a presumption of equal contribution. The difficulty is that,
absent such a presumption, the law might view the more readily
measurable contributions of the traditional husband as greater than
the more personal and non-monetized contributions of the traditional
wife. Thus, there is a risk in relying on an equality principle that
measures distribution according to contribution.
Professor Fineman acknowledges the varying meanings of
equality, as well as the troublesome interplay between equality and
the notion of contribution. She rejects the equal treatment model
and its focus on contribution in favor of an equality model that
would focus on the economic needs of women who are impoverished
by divorce. Her model, which she calls result equality, would
support a distribution rule aimed at correcting the economic
disparities that result from divorce. 2 Despite the possibilities for
reform based on this model of equality, Fineman ultimately concludes that the rhetoric of equality is too easily appropriated by
antifeminists and, thus, that it is "time to abandon equality."33
Although Fineman makes a good case for the abandonment of
equality, I am left wondering what normative principle we can adopt
to take its place. Fineman blames equality for supporting property
division rules that have benefitted men at the expense of women.
Her call to abandon equality is, in part, a call for new rules governing property distributions at divorce, rules that she believes will treat
women more fairly by acknowledging need. Yet she fails to offer
a clear normative principle in support of need-based distributions.
Despite the validity of Fineman's critique, I find myself
reluctant to abandon equality until feminist theorists have engaged in

31. See Lou text accompanying notes 65-66.
32. nfift now 69.
33. FiEm.m, s.ura notw 25, at 190.
HeinOnline -- 1 Tex. J. Women & L. 254 1992
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a more thorough debate about its meaning in the context of family
relationships and divorce. And if equality fails as a normative guide
for property divisions, then I believe feminist theorists should work
towards developing alternative norms that can respond to the
divergent needs of the divorcing spouses, especially when those
needs are exacerbated by the gender roles that accompany marriage
and divorce.
This review focuses on the need to identify a normative theory
for property divisions at divorce, whether or not that theory is
expressed in the rhetoric of equality. In Part I, I begin with
Fineman's treatment of the Wisconsin experience in adopting
equality as a rule for property division. I discuss this portion of the
book first because I think it helps set the stage for Fineman's
objections to equality theory. In Part H, I turn to the question: What
is wrong with equality? In Part III, I search for a norm other than
equality to guide us in making decisions about property at divorce.
Finally, I conclude that Fineman is correct in arguing that our
current property distribution rules inadequately address need. What
is required, I suggest, is a normative principle, strong enough to
compete with equality, that will justify need-based distribution rules.
I.

The Wisconsin Experience With Divorce and Equality

One way in which equality principles become relevant at divorce
is in the division of marital property. In Chapter 3, Professor
Fineman traces the development of the equal division rule in the
state of Wisconsin, a development she attributes to a misguided
effort by liberal feminist reformers. The chapter provides some
useful insight into the process of law reform as it occurred against
a backdrop of the national feminist movement. This reform
occurred in the mid-1970s, well before feminists in law had
adequately debated the problems with equality theory. Given the
historical context in which the Wisconsin reform occurred, Fineman
might have been more generous in her description of the reformers.
Nonetheless, her treatment of the topic does reveal a very important
deficit in much feminist activism: the failure to listen adequately to
all women.
The women's movement of the 1960s and '70s has been
criticized for initiating legal reforms that primarily serve the interests
of white, middle-class women. Equal pay for equal work is such a
HeinOnline -- 1 Tex. J. Women & L. 255 1992
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reform; it particularly benefits women who are trained and capable
of doing the same highly paid work that some men do (e.g., doctors,
lawyers). Highly paid women can afford to pay others for child
care. But lower class working women, even if they receive equal
pay for doing the same work as men, cannot afford child care. The
specific criticism levelled against the women's movement of the
1960s and '70s is that activists should have listened more closely to
these working women of lower socio-economic groups so that
working class reforms might have been given a higher priority.
Professor Fineman levies a similar attack against the feminists
who fought for divorce reform in Wisconsin. That is, she charges
them with listening only to the stories of white, middle-class women
in garnering support for the reform statutes. The primary story used
by the reformers is one that Fineman dubs the "horror story" of the
displaced homemaker.' To understand this so-called horror story,
one must remember that divorce reform in Wisconsin began, as it
did in most states, with the battle over no-fault. No-fault divorce
means that, absent a required proof of fault, either spouse has equal
power to initiate and obtain a -divorce. On the surface, no-fault
divorce rules are consistent with the principle of equality because
they provide equal access to divorce. Although this principle of
equal access may be true conceptually, the practical reality is that,
absent fault, a male spouse's power to acquire divorce is greater than
a female spouse's simply because males in general have more power
than females.35 The problem is that power at the time of divorce
implicates more than the mere ability to obtain a divorce. Power
also determines relative property rights and custody issues. The
person with greater power is more likely to obtain a larger share of
property, as well as custody, if it is desired. The male's power at
time of divorce had been partially offset under old law by the
female's power to refuse to grant a divorce; no-fault divorce stripped
females of that power.
34. 1L at 63 (telling the story
ofawoman in a common law state whose husband decides to leave her because
she has acquired no property of her own and common law states did not at the time recogniz spouSaI rights in
property at divorce, she could be dispossessed of the family home, as well as anything else that was separately
owned by the husband-despite the fact that she had eared for the home and the children for most of her adult life).
35. T s is especially true in common law states where a husband might have acquired all of the property
during man ae in his own name u his separate property. Despite equitable distribution laws, property divisions
have tended to emphasize individual entitlements. See Rhode & Minow, supra note 30, at 199-201 (arguing that

the state needs to play a greater role in specifying standards for property allocation to ensure that distributive
decisions depend on the partW' domestic as well as economic contributions to the relationship and on their future
needsad eading potentis].
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Fortunately, the Wisconsin liberal feminist reformers, who
supported no-fault divorce, became aware of the potential economic
harm to women that was likely to accompany enactment of a no-fault
divorce statute. This awareness was heightened by horror stories
imported from other states that had enacted no-fault. The typical
horror story involved a dutiful wife who had worked in the home
during a long-term marriage, thereby acquiring no property in her
own name. At the time of divorce, she was virtually kicked out into
the cold, with no property or viable means of support. To protect
against this result, no-fault divorce would have to be accompanied
by the enactment of economic protections for such women. In
Wisconsin, the economic protection supported by the reformers and
ultimately adopted by the state was equal division of property at
divorce. Fineman criticizes this solution.
II. What's Wrong With Equality?
The concept of equality in this country is rooted in liberal
political theory. Liberal feminists have applied the concept of
equality by arguing that women should be treated the same as men.
37
Fineman refers to this concept of equality as "rule-equality." 38
Another possible concept of equality is known as result-equality.
Feminists use this concept of equality when they argue for substantive changes in existing institutions that will lead to equality of result
between men and women.
For example, employer-provided
maternity leave and child care would produce substantive changes in
the market that would enable women to work full time on an equal
basis with men. Rule-equality arguments cannot bring about this
change in the marketplace because rule-equality works only when
women are similarly situated with men.39
Fineman notes that result-equality has been more readily
embraced by feminists in the fight for legal reform in public sphere
activities than in the fight for legal reform in the private sphere of
36. See FINMAN, supra note 25, at 62-64 (giving examples of disturbing divorce experiences).

37. Ld.
at 20-21 (referring sometimes to rule equality as formal equality); see also Cain, supra note 14, at 81720 (discussing historical roots and construction of formal equality).
38. See FINEMAN, supra note 25, at 21 (referring sometimes to result equality as substantive equality); see

also Cain, supranote 14, at 825 (Equality is capable of being understood to require redistributions and substantive
changes in material conditions.*).
39. Since only women get pregnant and since mothers, rather than fathers, tend to take primaay responsibility
for childcare, women and mea ar not similarly situated with respect to childbirth and childcare.

HeinOnline -- 1 Tex. J. Women & L. 257 1992

258

Texas Journal of Women and the Law

[Vol. 1

family law.4" She cites comparable worth and affirmative action as
two reform efforts in the public sphere that reflect notions of resultequality.4 One possible reason that feminists are more willing to
fight for substantive reforms in the market is that, due to women's
historical exclusion from the public sphere, the market has been
constructed by men. "By contrast, women's experience in the
family is not an experience of exclusion or suppressed opportunity
'
but of overparticipation and extensive respofisibility."42

Thus,

observes Fineman, if affirmative action principles are to be applied
in the private sphere of family in the same way that they have been
applied in the public sphere, they will likely be applied in favor of
men, "particularly fathers seeking custody. "43
Equality arguments that favor women in the context of families
support equal responsibility for child care and domestic chores. If
husbands and wives bore equal responsibility for these burdens, then
wives would be as free to enter the market as are their husbands.'
Note, however, that these equality arguments have more application
within an ongoing marriage than at divorce. Fineman suggests that
liberal feminists readily embraced the rhetoric of equality in the
home as a consequence of their true goal: equal access to the
market. Because one's participation in the family necessarily affects
one's ability to participate in the marketplace and the political
sphere, arguments about participation in each sphere ought to be
consistent. If gender equality rules are applied in the public sphere,
then similar rules ought to be applied in the private sphere."
Although Fineman notes the symbolic power of this consistent
approach regarding equality arguments, 46 she clearly rejects
symbolism as a sufficient justification for the effects of rule-equality
in the real lives of real women.47
Whereas rule-equality as to child care and domestic chores
within an ongoing marriage might result in some real benefits for
40. FDmAN, supra note 25, at 23-24.
41. Id. at 23.
42. Id at 25.
43. Id.
44. Wives would of course remain subject to the additional burden of pregnancy, a biological burden that
cannot be shifted to husbands.
45. nNFmAN,supra note 25, at 24.
46. I4 at 25-26.
47. Id. at 28 ('Unfortunately, in the family-law area, as a symbolic characterization, equality has taken on
a life of its own and is emphasized to the exclusion of the fine distinctions in decision making that are necessary
to achieve a more individualized or just notion of equality.*).
HeinOnline -- 1 Tex. J. Women & L. 258 1992
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wives who bear an unequal portion of the total domestic responsibility, an extension of rule-equality principles at divorce can result in
unwarranted detriments to wives. At divorce, rule-equality supports
treating husband and wife the same with regard to property division
and child custody. On its face, equal division of property and equal
access to child custody may seem to produce just results. After all,
if marriage is an equal partnership, then there theoretically ought to
be an equal division of assets at dissolution. Fineman argues,
however, that the intellectual appeal of equality may not, in fact,
withstand closer scrutiny. The difficulties she discusses include:
1. The presumption of equal contribution can disadvantage.
the wife who over-contributes. The purpose of equal division of
property at divorce is to reimburse the marital partners equally for
their presumably equal contributions to the partnership. Liberal
feminists supported this reform because it benefitted women who
previously were given no credit at the time of divorce for unpaid
labor in the home. By presuming that the wife's contributions in the
home are equal to the husband's financial contributions derived from
his work outside the home, liberal feminists viewed rule-equality as
improving the condition of most divorcing women. Fineman argues
that this view of the matter ignores the fact that most women work
outside the home as well as inside the home. In such cases, the
wife's contribution to the marital unit is likely to exceed her
husband's, and thus an equal division of property is actually unjust
as to the wife.4"
Comment: This criticism is not a critique of the
equality norm that requires equal distribution to equal
contributors. That equality norm, if applied correctly,
would distribute more property to the greater contributor,
which in this case would be the wife. The difficulty that
Fineman identifies here is not a difficulty inherent in the
concept of equality. Rather, it is a difficulty that results
from a reform movement which adopted a presumption of
equality rather thanfrom the principle of equality itself At
its core, her criticism is that the rhetoric of equality tends
to mask important inequalities.

48. Id. at 29, 47.
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2. Treating parents as equal when they are not can disadvantage women in the property division process. The creation of
equal custody rights can be justified under rule-equality because
parents are presumed to be equal in terms of social distribution of
power;49 rule equality supports joint custody as the ideal solution.
In an ideal world, perhaps parents would be equal, both in their
actual participation in childrearing and in their desire to do so. But
in the real world, parents do not play the same roles or carry the
same responsibilities in the majority of families. Mothers actually
do most of the child rearing50 and they seem to have a stronger
desire to do so.5 To make joint custody available in this non-ideal
world causes a shift in power from mothers to fathers that may not
be just. First of all, such a rule ignores the possibly unequal
contributions of mother and father to the process of childrearing.
Second, the shift in power creates a further imbalance in the
bargaining process at the time of divorce. Because mothers typically
have a stronger desire than fathers to retain custody of their
children, they will be more willing to bargain away property rights
in exchange for the father's release of custody rights. 52 Given that
women generally. have less economic power than men, any reduction
in property awarded to the mother will merely contribute to the
increasing "feminization of poverty. "5
Comment: This criticism also fails as a critique of
equalityper se. The difficulty arises because the reformers
have presumed an equal desirefor child custody when the
reality is otherwise. Again, the rhetoric of equality has
masked an importantinequality.
49. Id.
at 84.
50. 14 at222 n.40 ("Mothers still
perform not only the vast bulk of child care, but also the majority of
housework.") (citing MaryJ. Bane et al.,
OC CareArragerasofWorking Parents, 102 MonTHLY LAB. Rv.
50, 52-53 (Oct. 1979) (reporting on the child carm arrangements of working parents)). See generally Catherine
L. Fisk,Employer-ProvidedOld Care Under 2WeiV. ToaRdAn ErployertrDuty To Acconmodate Odid Care
Reponlblitier of Enployees, 2 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 89, 90-96 (1986) (discussing child care, equal
employment, and economic equality for women); Mary 3. Frug, Securing Job Equaliyfor Women" LaborMarket
Hosily to Working Mothenr, 59 B.U. L. REv. 55, 56 (1979) (stating that women, mome than men, are
disadvantaged by the barriers operating against parents in the labor masket).
51. See ViCoR F. FUCKs, WomEN's QuEsr VOR BENowc EQus.rr 67-68 (1988) (Fuchs argues that if
men's desire for children and concern about their welfare were equal to women's, then when women performed
child care services, men would readily pay for these services and *the
present hierarchy of power would be
reversed.). Id. at 68.
52. FIMN, supra note 25, at 222-23 n.43.
53. See Mazy J. Bane, Houseold Composiro and Poverty, In FomNo PovERTY: WHAT WORKS AND
WHAT DOESN'T 209, 220-31 (Sheldon H. Danziger & Daniel H. Weinberg eds.,
1986) (discussing reasons why
a female household head and her children might have become poor).
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In sum, the problem with equality in the context of family law
is that the rhetoric of equality has resulted in equal treatment for
individuals who are not similarly situated. Although the rhetoric of
equal treatment has improved the economic situation of some women
at divorce by giving them credit for previously unvalued contributions to the marital relationship, such as, housework and child care,
the rhetoric has also served to disadvantage women by masking the
reality of their overparticipation and by ignoring their unequal
bargaining power in general. To treat unequals as equals is not only
unjust, it also can create further inequality.
H1. If Equality is Abandoned, What is the Just Measure for Property
Division at Divorce?
If equal division is not the correct rule, then how should we
determine who gets what property at divorce? What factors should
we consider, and what underlying normative principle ought to guide
us? These are the remaining questions if one agrees with Professor
Fineman that we ought to reject equal division.
Historically, equal division rules were found in community
property states in which spouses were viewed as equal partners in
the marital partnership.54
Equal division rules can be either
absolute, that is, with no deviations, or presumptive, with deviations
permitted if equal division would be inequitable.55 Based on the
theory that marriage is a partnership of equals, community property
regimes purported to recognize equal rights of the spouses in the
property acquired during the partnership.56 Despite the inaccuracy
of the portrayal of husbands and wives as equal partners, the norm

54. See Bea Ann Smith, Th Parneldp Theory ofMarag" A Bomwed Solution FaiLs, 68 TEx. L. REV.
689, 690-91 (1990) (referring to the long experience with the partnership model of the eight community property

states).
55. See Doris J. Freed & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Ffify States: An Overview, 24 FAM. L. Q.
309, 335-37 (1991) (isting seven community property states currently enforcing equal or presumptively equal
divisions of property at divorce). California, for example, requires equal division unless one spouse has
misappropriated community property deliberately. Id. Table IV, n.3 (listing tea community property states,
including the eight traditional ones: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, New Mexico, Nevada, Texas, and

Washington as well as Wisconsin, which is considered a community property jurisdiction since it adopted the
Martial Property Act, and Mississippi). I have no idea why Mississippi is included.
56. Of course, the principle that spouses had equal property rights was not in fact the rule at the time

community property regimes developed in the eight traditional community propety states. For example, only the
husband had management powers of the couple's property. See generally, SMrrt, supranote 54, at 689 (stating

that the *red objective of early marital property laws was to create and protect a wife's separate property, not to
create community property').
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of equality nonetheless remains as the operative principle behind the
concept of community property and its presumption of equal division
at divorce.
Alternatively, the partnership metaphor suggests a different
normative principle: that individuals should be compensated fairly
for their labor. This principle is consistent with the "labor-desert
theory" of property rights reflected in the writings of John Locke.57
Equal distribution at divorce can be justified by the desert principle,
provided husband and wife have made equal contributions to the
marriage and provided that the property subject to distribution is
traceable to spousal labor. The labor-desert theory is consistent with
community property regimes because marital partners are treated as
though they contributed only labor (and not property) to the
partnership. Pre-marriage property, as well as gifts and devises
acquired during marriage, are characterized as separate property and
thus are not available for division at divorce.5"
In contrast to community property states, common law states,
prior to recent reforms, did not treat marriages as a partnership of
equals. Historically, common law states relied on title as the most
important factor to determine distribution of property at divorce.
Since title to property was usually vested in the person making
monetized contributions to the marriage, common law states tended
to reward the wage-earning spouse, typically the husband.59
With the passage of equitable distribution laws over the past
twenty years, title has become less important in determining
ownership of property at divorce. Some common law states, taking
their lead from community property regimes, have included in their
equitable distribution statutes a presumption of equal distribution at

57. See lO N Locuk,

Two TRPATISES oP' GoveRsmENT 303-320 (Pectr Laslett od., 1960) (cxplaining that

things produced from one's own labor bcnome oe's property); Walton H. Hamilton, Property-According to
Locke, 41 YALE LI. 864 (1932).
58. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977) (holding that a husband's separato realty could
not be awarded to wife at divorce); see also Camero v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1982) (citing Eggeneyer

with approval, butholding that personalty acqurecd during marriagein a common law state, oven though t chnically
separate, prpety, is subject to division at divorce). See TEx. PAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63(b) (Vernon Supp. 1992)
(authorizing division at divorce of any quasi-community property, e.g., property acquired during marriage in a

common law state).
59. See Masygold S. MeMJi, Cawsmxdng a Socal Problem: The Post-Divorce Plight of Women and

ilidren,

1986 AM. B. FoUND. REs. J. 759, 771 (pointing out the resulting unfairness of this approach to the nonwageearaing spoa).
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divorce.' The concept that marriage is a partnership of equals is
behind much of this common law reform.
Thus, in both community property and common law states,
current rules regulating division of property at divorce reflect a
recognition of the desert principle that property distributions should
be made in accord with labor contributions. Equal division rules can
also be explained by equality theory. The argument that spouses
should be compensated justly for their individual contributions to the
marriage is based, as I suggested earlier in this review, on an equal
treatment model of equality. Equal treatment requires an identification of the factor in regard to which individuals should be treated
equally. The relevant factor here is "contribution." The model
might more accurately be referred to as "desert-equality." Whether
desert-equality will prove a satisfactory principle for feminists who
are concerned about the needs of wives who have been disadvantaged by marriage and divorce depends on how "contribution" is
defined. A large part of Fineman's concern about the misuse of
equality might be resolved if "contribution" were defined to value
fully the various forms of women's contributions to marriage.
Under such circumstances, she might feel less compelled to abandon
equality as a principle in making property divisions.
Perhaps it is the rhetoric of contribution rather than the rhetoric
of equality (related though they may be) that does most of the
damage in property division. Reward for individual contribution
under the desert principle will naturally disadvantage wives if their
contributions are valued less in the distribution process. Given
society's undervaluation of homemaking and child rearing generally,
it should not be surprising that contributions of this sort are
undervalued at divorce.6"
One solution to the valuation problem is to presume equal
contribution and thus to grant equal division under desert-equality.
This solution, however, is not as successful as it might be since, in
most states, the presumption is rebuttable. It is rebuttable by
reference to factors that judges may consider in varying equal

60. See, e.g., ARK. Cone ANN. J 9-12-315(a)(1)(A) (Michie 1991) (stating that *all marital property shall
be distributed oae-half (12) to each party unless the court finds such a division to be inequitable); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-20(c) (1991) (stating that "there shall be an equal divisioa by using net value of marital property unlesa

the court determin that an equal division is not equitable').
61. See Mclli, spra note 59, at 772 (*As long as society continues to undervalue the ce.onomie stal
homaaking and child rearing, any solutions at the time of divorce will probably only have a minor impaet).
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division. Professor Fineman lists nine of the most common factors
and concludes that they fall into two primary categories: contribution
and need. 62
Factors in the contribution category include: (1) length of marriage; (2) property brought into the marriage; (3) labor contributions
to the marriage, including child care and homemaking activities; (4)
one spouse's contribution to the other spouse's education or earning
power. Factors in the need category include: (1) whether there are
additional assets available to the spouse post-divorce that are not
subject to division; (2) age and health; (3) earning capacity; (4)
custodial responsibility for children; (5)time and expense necessary
for spouse to retrain for work outside the home.
Fineman emphasizes need over contribution, and she explains
why the current statutory framework makes that impossible. Assume
an equal division principle as the starting point. Equal division
presumes equal contribution. To avoid pure equal division, each
spouse will point to factors in her or his favor.
Even if a wife could meet the burden of demonstrating that her
needs should outweigh the equal contribution assumptions, her
husband could. argue the presence or absence of other factors in an
attempt to counter the assertion that deviation is appropriate.
Because the factors are not weighted or ranked, one factor or set
of factors may be balanced against another in the decisionmaking

process. As a result, unless one spouse can assert that she
occupies all, or most of the categories (an unlikely scenario since
they are inherently incompatible), her spouse may use the
remaining factors to push the allocation toward the rule-equality
63

norm.

This criticism seems logically and intuitively correct as applied
to most fact situations. Furthermore, as an empirical matter, other
family law scholars have documented the fact that need factors tend
to be ignored by the courts, whereas contribution factors are
favored.64 However, in some fact situations, I can imagine a wife
who might argue both contribution factors (e.g., long-term marriage,
performance of child care and homemaking services, supporting
62. FNMN,

sura note 25, at 4142. Title and fault are two additional, but less prevalnt, categories into

which these factors might be placed.

63. rd.at 50.
64. See Suzan

Reynolds, The Rdadnsthip offtPey Dlskc and Almony: The DSioWn ofPropery to

Addrr Need, 56 FORDHAM L. Rev. 827 (1988) (exploring the relationship of propeq divisioa and armony in
addressing the need for spousal support at divorce).
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husband's career) and need factors (e.g., age and health, no earning
capacity outside home) to support a distribution of more than half of
the marital property to her. Whether she will be successful depends
not on her inability to argue contribution and need, but on her
husband's ability to argue that he contributed more and that his
contribution should trump her need.
Fineman blames rule equality for the legal emphasis on
contribution and the diminished attention to need. She identifies the
nexus between equality and contribution when she observes:
"Contribution is an equalizing concept, while need demands an
acknowledgment and evaluation of differences. 65 I have focused
on this very same nexus in my explanation of the principle of desertequality (i.e., equal distribution to equal contributors). Fineman
understands the moral suasion of this principle, but she also
understands that it provides us with little guidance for dealing with
the problem of need. 6 Given the established needs of divorced
wives and children,67 Fineman's critique of equality forces us to
reconsider whether desert-equality is a sufficient principle for
making property division decisions at divorce.
Consider again Fineman's criticism of the inherent incompatibility of the factors. A wife can argue that, because of her lower
earning capacity, she has a need for more property at distribution.
Her husband can then counter that he brought most of the assets into
the marriage, that the marriage has been short-term, and that she did
not contribute to his earning power.' These arguments do not
disprove the fact of her need. They do support the claim that the
marital property is primarily the result of his personal efforts and
thus rightly belongs to him. The court will favor his arguments over
her argument so long as it envisions marriage as a partnership of
equals in which individual contributions are to be tallied up and paid
out to the partners at time of dissolution in accord with their
respective contributions.

65. FINEMAN, supra note 25, at 46.
66. FeumAN, supra note 25, at 52 ("rlThe equality solution is inadequate for the problem of nced.").
67. See terriuly LENoRE Werlmm, THE DrvoRen REvoLUtrON: THE UNEXECTED SOaAL AND
ECONOMIc CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMeRICA (1985). Weitzman's statistics, which focus

on California divorces after the enactment of no-fault, show that divorced women and their children arn
economically disadvantaged when compared with divorced men. She futhar shows that this economic disadvantage
has increased as a result of the fact that no-fault divorces result in lower property awards to women; see also
Weitzman, Brin &g the Law Bad /n,1986 AM. B. FoUND. REs. J.791,794.
68. FINEms supr note 25, at 50.
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It should not be surprising that an emphasis on equality has
lured courts toward an overvaluation of contribution factors.
Equality is an attractive principle with a venerable history in
American law. If need-based factors are to be given equal attention
by the courts, then we must identify an equally appealing principle
that justifies distribution rules based on need.69
Although she does not offer a normative principle in support of
need-based distributions in this book, Fineman's earlier scholarship
suggests one possibility. 70 She describes the controversy over
property distribution rules as stemming from "two competing and,
perhaps incompatible and unrealistic, political visions of contemporary marriage."71 In contrast to the equal partnership model is the
dependency model, based on the principle that "the family is the
appropriate, perhaps solitary, institution to resolve problems of
dependency or need that inevitably arise in the context of families."72 Fineman does not develop this point further, either in her
earlier work or in this book. Thus, she never explains why the
family is the appropriate institution to resolve problems of need. 73
While there may be no obvious answer to this question, it is
worthy of debate. Arguably, there is something about the fact that
society is organized into families which justifies holding family
members responsible for each other's needs, including post-divorce
needs. Perhaps the justification is that, in general, families are good
for a society; they provide an efficient means of social organization,
especially when one spouse takes on the responsibility of childcare
and stays out of the marketplace. Before entering into such an
arrangement, however, a rational actor would require some assurance that the choice to stay out of the marketplace, would not be
69. Istorically, of course, concerns about need were remedied primarily by an award of alimony. Alimony
is still available and it can take many forms (such as permanent, temporary, or rehabilitative). Factors that
determine whether an award of alimony is appropriate include matrimonl misconduct, fault, and the relative needs
of the spouses. See gemeraly Freed & Walker, supranote 55, at 353-61. The current wave of divorce reform
has promoted the philosophy that need is better addressed by property division than by alimony. Despite this
aspect of the reform movement, courts have apparently been reluetant to follow through and use available property
to address need. See Reynolds, supra note 61 (addressing the relationship of property division and alimony).
70. See Martha A. Fineman, Sociel Factors AffectIng the Creaton of Legal Ruies for Distibution of
Property at Divorce, in AT 'm BouNDmaMs oF LAw 265,269-271 (Martha A. Fineman & Nancy S. Thomadsen
eds., 1991).
71. 1&at 265.
72. rd.
73. Fimcn s task in the article was descriptive (explaining that the existence of two conflicting visions of
the family has contributed to the conflict between contribution and need factora) rather than normative. Since she
was not advocating the depeodency model as a preferrd norm, she was not required to argue in favor of the family
as th appropriate resolvr of need problems.
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unduly disadvantageous in the future. Governmental imposition of
responsibility for family members post-divorce gives to the rational
actor the requisite assurance to encourage participation in family
units, even when the participation creates a potentially disadvantageous risk of dependency.
Although the argument I have just outlined may accurately
describe our view of families and their responsibilities in the past,
I would not personally favor the argument as a normative principle
for assigning post-divorce responsibility in modem times.7 4 And
yet some such normative principle is needed to justify property
distributions based on need.
There are other possibilities. To the extent the post-divorce
needs of women are influenced by their adherence to traditional
gender roles, the law might assign responsibility to those persons
who benefit from those roles. Thus, for example, it would be just
to transfer property from husbands to wives in order to compensate
wives for their lower wage-earning capacity if this could be traced
to the wife's many years as a housewife-years of fulfilling a gender
role that presumably benefitted her husband. On the other hand, this
principle would not necessarily support a wealth transfer from
husband to wife if the sole reason for the lower wage-earning
capacity was that societal discrimination generally caused women to
make less than men.75
This, then, is the crux of the matter: Equality provides a strong
principle for valuing contributions over need in making property
distribution decisions at divorce. Yet we cannot ignore the very real
existence of need, a need that becomes apparent at divorce because
losses caused by divorce fall disproportionately on women.7 6 Is it
always just to take property from the divorced husband to mitigate
the needs of the wife? This question must be answered before we
74. I certainly do not subscribe to the view that the family should be the solitary institution to resolve
problems of need that arise within the family. Need for child care arises within the family, and yet I view child
care as a need that ought to be addressed by society as a whole.
75. Herbert Jacob makes a similar point in Jacob, Faultig No-Fault, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. REs. . 773,77980.
76. Overall, divorce is a losing proposition. At divorce an efficiently operating family unit is divided into
two less efficient units. With no increase in income, the post-divorce parents nonetheless experience higher living
costs because they now need two homes rather than one. Thus, their combined standard of living must necessarily
decline. &C LENORE WEnrziw, THE DIvORC REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMiC
CONSEQUNCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN INA EICA, at xii (1985) (showing that one year after divorce the
male's standardof living has increased 42%, whereas the female with minor children experiences a decline of 73 %,
and that the combined "loss" is a 31% decline in standard of living, a loss which is borne exclusively by the exwife).
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can justify trumping rule equality and the principle of desert with
need. Fineman presumes the answer to this question is yes.
Although she may well be right, I would prefer a more developed
discussion about why her answer is yes.
IV. Conclusion
Martha Fineman's The Illusion of Equality is an important
contribution to feminist literature on divorce reform. She argues,
with valuable practical insight, that equality has not served the
interests of women in divorce proceedings. She concludes that the
rhetoric of equality has so tainted the discourse that we must explore
new ways to talk about the issues and problems raised. Although
she calls -for us to abandon the concept of equality as a normative
standard, I have suggested that we ought to develop an alternative
normative theory before we feel free to abandon the concept of
equality completely. Fineman and I agree that we need to address
the concrete needs of post-divorce women and children upon whom
the economic loss of divorce disproportionately falls. Because the
rhetoric of equality is not well-suited to this endeavor, we need to
develop alternate theories that ask the following questions: What
produces the loss at divorce? Who is responsible for the loss? Who
has benefitted from the factors that contribute to the loss? Some
theorists have begun addressing these questions. 7 Martha Fineman's fine critique of equality ought to encourage others to continue
the process.

77. See Smith, supra note 54, at 73942 (arguing for a theory of *enterprise liability* that could be applied
to property division at divorce); Stephen D. Sugarman, D'ding Fnancial Intereit on Divorce, in DiVORce
REFORM AT THE CROSSROADs 130, 148-63 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herna H. Kay eds., 1990) (suggesting
'faimess considerations' that include recognition of "necessity-based rights," *expectations of the parties," and
'unjust enrichment.'); Rhode & inow, supra note 30 (supporting property divisions that reward "sharing
behavior' and cali for more state resxsibility in reducing the economic inequalities caused by gender relations
that have historically favored men).
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